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I. Introduction 
On 2 November 2012, the seventeen members of the Pacific Islands Forum 
Fisheries Agency (FF A) 1 adopted a new treaty providing for cooperation in 
fisheries surveillance and law enforcement activities. The Agreement on 
Strengthening Implementation of the Niue Treaty on Cooperation in Fisheries 
Surveillance and Law Enforcement in the South Pacific Region (the Agreement), 2 
is clearly underpinned by a common purpose; the creation .of a strong but flexible 
mechanism that actively encourages cooperation between the Parties and 
maximises the reach and effectiveness of their jurisdiction and assets in the conduct 
of fisheries surveillance and enforcement. It also reflects a commitment to the use 
and continuous development of new tools, technologies and laws to combat illegal, 
unreported and unregulated fishing, and a recognition of the potential benefits of 
closer cooperation and information-sharing in relation to both fisheries and broader 
law enforcement activities. 
This Agreement is not 'just another fisheries treaty'. As overfishing in a number 
of the world's oceans makes the rich tuna resources of the Pacific region 
increasingly attractive to global fishing fleets, this Agreement is a timely 
mechanism to enhance its members' individual strength through collective 
cooperation. It is a product of the context and process of its negotiation and 
adoption; it reflects the high-level political commitment of Pacific Island Leaders 
to these issues, and the cooperative multilateralism that has been integral to the 
success of the FF A for more than thirty years. More than that, however, the 
Agreement introduces a number of modem and innovative concepts intended to 
provide its Parties with the widest possible range of opportunities for cooperation, 
consistent with international law and reflecting the practical realities of fisheries 
enforcement in the Pacific region. Against the backdrop of Pacific fisheries, this 
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rtt. l wi·u provide an overview of the Agreement and some of its more unique a c e 1' ' · h FF A d features, allowing consideration of whether these are 'bespol\.e ~o t e · . an . the 
Pacific region, or whether they might provide a template for use 1n other contexts. 
II. Painting the picture: policy, law and politics 
The Agreement is inherently the product of the Paci.fie island count~i~s that 
developed it; it reflects the practical realities of the pohcy, law and p~ht1cs that 
shape Pacific fisheries, and addresses the particular needs of the countries by and 
for whom it was designed. 
(a) The policy context: Pacific fisheries 
The factual backdrop to this issue is well known, but it is worth canvassing a few 
key issues for coritext. The western and central Pacific region is the world's largest 
and most valuable tuna fishery: it covers 30 million km2 of ocean and produces half 
of the global tuna catch (largely in the ·exclusive economic zones of the coastal 
states). 3 The coastal states are predominantly small, developing Pacific island 
countries, for which the fishery resources are of vital significance to ensure 
sustainable development and economic security.4 However, these resources are also 
eagerly sought after by distant water fishing nations, which come from around the 
world to fish for tuna and other highly migratory species in the rich fishing grounds 
of the western and central Pacific. Under these circumstances, effective domestic 
and (given the highly migratory nature of these species, which move through 
numerous areas of national jurisdiction and high seas) regional regulation is 
essential to ensure the long-term sustainability of the fishery and the successful 
development of domestic fishing industries. But with enormous maritime zones to 
police and only limited assets available, the .Pacific island countries struggle to 
undertake the surveillance and enforcement activities necessary to effectively 
protect these resources. 
Fisheries enforcement is an inherently difficult activity, due in no small part to 
the jurisdictional gaps and overlaps that exist in the law of the sea. In the Exclusive 
Economic Zone, there is the potential for conflict between the right of foreign 
vessels to navigate freely and the coastal state's right to regulate fishing activities, 
while on the high seas it is necessary to appropriately balance the duty to cooperate 
in the conservation and management of fishery resources with the freedoms of 
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fishing and navigat~on, and the pri?'acy of ~ag stat~ jurisdiction. 5 I~ addition to 
these legal difficult1es, fo~ de: elop1n.g, countries, particularly those with . ~uch vast 
maritime zones as the Pacific islands, the large area of ocean space relative to the 
land area, the migratory nature of fleets and fisheries resources, lack of financial 
and technical resources and skilled manpower compound the problem' of fisheries 
enforcement. 6 
It is not surprising, then, that cooperation on fisheries issues has been a key 
focus in this region since the very first meeting of the Pacific Islands Forum (then 
the South Pacific Forum) in 1971.7 In 1977, noting the need to establish 200 
nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zones, harmonise fisheries policies in the region, 
and adopt a coordinated approach in relation to distant water fishing countries, 
Pacific Island leaders adopted the Declaration on the Law of the Sea and the 
Regional Fisheries Agency. 8 The Declaration recognised the common interests of 
the Pacific Island Countries with respect to fisheries, and the need for a regional 
fisheries agency to advise on and coordinate policies and activities (including with 
respect to surveillance and enforcement) in order to secure the maximum benefits 
from these resources. 
The mandate provided by this Declaration was implemented and realised very 
quickly, with the adoption and entry into force of the South Pacific Forum Fisheries 
Agency Convention9 (the FFA Convention) in 1979. The FFA Convention 
established the Forum Fisheries Agency, which consists of the Forum Fisheries 
Committee (comprising representatives of all the member countries) to provide 
policy and administrative guidance and direction, and a permanent Secretariat 
(located in Honiara, Solomon Islands) to provide advice and assistance to the 
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members. The FF A has been extremely successful in fulfilling t~.e task a~sig~ed it, 
and has played a key role both in advising .members o? domestic fishen~s 1ss~es, 
and in the dev·elopment of a number of regional fisheries arrangetnents, including 
in particular the Convention for the Conservation and M~nagement of Highly 
Migratory Fish Stacks in the Central and Western. P~c1fic O~ean (WCP~C 
Convention). IO This Convention establishes the prmc1pal reg1o~al ~sher~es 
management .organisation in the region -- the Western and C~ntr~l Pacific Fisheries 
Commission (the WCPFC} ~ to enable multilateral cooperation 1n the management 
of the lucrative tuna fishery. · 
(b) The legal framework: UNCLOS and the Niue Treaty 
With. the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 11 (the 
UNCLOS) in 1982, and the fonnal establishment of 200 nautical mile Exclusive 
Economic Zones, the Pacific Island Countries gained sovereign rights over the 
valuable fishery resources in an enormous expanse of ocean and, importantly, the 
necessary jurisdiction to enforce those rights. The legal framework established by 
the UNCLOS incontrovertibly recognises the right of coastal States to exercise 
enforcement jurisdiction in relation to the exploitation of living resources in the 
exclusive economic zone. This is reflected in Article 73(1) of the UN CLOS, which 
provides that coastal states may take such measures as are necessary to ensure 
compliance with their laws and regulations for the exploration, exploitation, 
conservation and management of the living resources in the Exclusive Economic 
Zone, including boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings. While the 
UNCLOS does not specify the extent of the powers that may be exercised in this 
regard, support for an expansive interpretation can be found in Article 62(4), which 
provides a lengthy (and non-exhaustive) list of areas that may be regulated and, as a 
necessary corollary, enforced by coastal states. 
From as early as 1982, the FF A members worked to develop and implement a 
legal framework for the regulation of fishing on a regional basis, in order to 
maximise their ability to effectively exercise these rights in their Exclusive 
Economic Zones. Key measures (which continue" to form the cornerstone of 
re~onal fisheries monitoring, control and surveillance) included the application of 
refµonal terms and ·conditions for foreign vessels wishing to access Pacific Island 
Countries' Exclusive :&:onomic Zones, 12 a -regional register of foreign fishing 
vessels, 13 and a centrahsed system for the satellite tracking of foreign fishing 
IO 
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vessels.14 However, none of these forms of r.egulation could address the difficulty 
of on .. water enforcement, which required assets and personnel. Accordingly, at the 
20th South Pacific Forum meeting in 1989, Pacific Island leaders recognised the 
urgent need for closer co-operation to protect and preserve fishery and other marine 
resources, and directed the FF A to investigate the design and development of an 
integrated program of regional fisheries surveillance. IS The Forum Fisheries 
Committee considered that the treaty was a matter of 'utmost' urgency 16 and in 
April 1992, FF A members adopted the Niue Treaty on Cooperation in Fisheries 
Surveillance and Law Enforcement in the South Pacific Region 17 (the Niue 
Treaty). 
The objective of the Niue Treaty has been described as promoting 'maximum 
effectiveness in regional or sub-regional surveillance and enforcement through 
cooperation between countries on a joint or reciprocal basis'. 18 In order to 
maximise the potential for cooperation, and the effective use of enforcement assets, 
Article VI of the Niue Treaty provides for the Parties to establish subsidiary 
agreements or arrangements, by which they can cooperate in the provision of 
personnel,. vessels and aircraft, and agree to undertake fisheries surveillance and 
law enforcement activities in each other's waters. It also requires Parties, to the 
extent permitted by their national laws and regulations, to provide relevant 
information {including information about the location and movement of foreign 
fishing vessels, foreign fishing vessel licensing, and fisheries surveillance and 
enforcement activities) to the FF A or any other Party directly. I 9 
However, although the Niue Treaty established a framework for cooperation, 
and facilitated the sharing of information between the Parties, it did not actually 
provide a mechanism for Parties to agree on carrying out operations, or include 
legally binding requirements for the exchange of specific information. Instead, it 
suggested that Parties could establish 'subsidiary agreements or arrangements,, 
setting out the details and agreement necessary to cooperate in the provision of 
personnel, vessels and aircraft and undertake fisheries surveillance and law 
enforce.ment in each other's waters. And although all 17 of the FFA members are 
Parties to the Niue Treaty, which has been in force for 20 years, only a very limited 
nu.mber of 'subsidiary agreements' have been negotiated - and many of those 
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which have were time bound an.d .have lapsed. 20 According ly th~ cooperative 
c. . nt bas not really matenahsed to the extent that was envisaged by th 
en1orceme . · . . . . e 
members during the negotiation of the Niue Treaty, and 1t 1.s generally c~ns1dered to 
have been under-utilised. 21 In addition, since not all Pa:r1es ha:e put in place the 
necessary arrangements or given permission for information shanng, the benefits of 
'shared intelligence' have not been realised to the extent expected. 
In the twenty years since the adoption of the Niue Treaty, there have been 
numerous other additions to the legal landscape governing international fisheries 
enforcement. These include, notably: 
( i) the 1992 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International 
Conservation and Management Measures by Vessels Fishing on the High 
Seas22 (the Compliance Agreement), which relates principally to the 
exercise of effective flag State responsibility over fishing vessels and the 
sharing of information with respect to those vessels through the 
establishment of a record of fishing vessels 
(ii) 
(iii) 
20 
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the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 
relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks 
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks23 (the Fish Stocks Agreement), which 
not only supplements the fisheries management provisions of UNCLOS 
with a more detailed set of rights and obligations for the conservation and 
management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, but provides a 
range of measures designed to improve monitoring, control and 
surveillance of high seas fisheries (including with respect to high seas 
boarding and inspection, and port State measures) 24 
the 2001 International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate 
Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (the IPOA-IUU), which was 
Current or previous subsidiary agreements or arrangements .include: Agreement 
between the Government of Tonga and the Government of Tuvalu on Cooperation in 
Fisheries Surveillance and Law Enforcement, signed 7 May 1993; Agreement among 
the Governments of the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall 
Islands and the Republic of Palau on Cooperation in Fisheries Surveillance and Law 
Enforcement, signed 7 February 2002; Agreement between the Government of the 
Cook Jslands and the Government of Niue on Cooperation in Fisheries Surveillance 
and Law Enforcement, signed 17 April 2008; Agreement between the Governments of 
the Cook Islands and the Independent State of Samoa on Cooperation in Fisheries 
Surveillance and Law Enforcement, signed 27 June 2008, and Agreement between the 
Governments of the Republic of Nauru and the Federated States of Micronesia on 
Cooperation in Fisheries Surveillance and Law Enforcement, signed 12 August 2010 
(copies on file with author). 
'Recen~ tren.ds in mo~itoring, control and surveillance systems for capture fisheries' , 
FAD Fisheries Technical Paper 415, Rome Food and Agn·culture Organization 2002, 
l 04. ' ' 
[2004] ATS 26, adopted in Rome, Italy on 24 December 1993, entered into force on 24 
April 2003. 
(2001] .t:\TS 8, adopted in New York, United States of America on 4 December 1995, 
entered mto force on 11December2001 . 
See, in particular, Articles l 8- 24. 
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negotiated under the auspices of the voluntary J 9'JS f At J .,f 
Conduct for ~esponsible Fisheries and wruch (whiJe al o ~vhm, ry 1n 
na~e ): estabhs.he~ th~5 concept of ' illegal,. unreported and unre. dated fishing ~IUU fi~h1ng) . and endorses the idea of combating I U ti hin~ 
through all available Jurisdiction in accordance with ink.1'natiomd faw' 
(including that of flag States, port States, coastal State~, market ~Ude and 
States of .nationality), 26 and 
(iv) the 2009 F AO Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent °'-'~..,. and 
Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing ('thc·
1 
Port late 
Measures Agreement)27 which (while not yet in force) rccogni1,cs tbc 
potential for effectively using port State jurisdiction to combat JU 
fishing, including through denying entry to port and use of port 8<.-ff~ 
for IUU fishing vessels, and blocking the landing and entry of 1LJLJ ... caught 
fish into international markets. 28 
While all of these instruments provide specific measures intended to enhance 
cooperation in fisheries enforcement and the exchange of information, none of 
them provide for the particular types of cooperation envisaged in the Niue Treaty, 
In part, this is a necessary corollary of their nature as global instrumenu.~ designed 
to provide globally applicable minimum rules or standards1 rather than t.o addre ff 
the specific issues faced by particular countries (Jike those of the Pacific islands), Jn 
addition, the acceptance and implementation of these globaJ. a~ecments and 
instruments has been varied. For example while the Fish Stocks Agreement bas 80 
Parties, 29 the Compliance Agreement (despite being concluded earlier) only has 39 
Parties. 30 Although the Port State Measures Agreement was not concluded u.nt:il 
2009, to date only 8 instruments of ratification, approval or acceptance have been 
deposited with the Depositary (and the Agreement requires 25 such instruments in 
order to enter into force which, in the case of the Compliance Agreement1 took ten 
years to be achieved).31 In this regard, the IPOA-fUU has been surprisingly 
successful: despite its voluntary nature, a number of States .have developed and 
implemented National Plans of Action to combat lUU fishing as called for in the 
IPOA, and a number of Regional Plans of Action have also been deveJopcd.32 
However, while these instruments have contributed to the general development of 
national and international practice, and to broadening the acceptance of new 
enforcement concepts such as high seas boarding and inspection and the use of port 
state jurisdiction, they have not obviated the need for the forms of cooperation 
25 
26 
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See: <http://www.fao.org/fishery/ipoa-iuu/npoa/en>. Although there is a 'model plan 
for a Pacific Island Country', to date no Pacific Island Country appears to have 
submitted a national plan for publication on the FAO web rt~. 
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envisaged by the Niue Treaty to address the particular requirements of the Pacific 
Island Countries. 
(c) The political impetus: 'Our Fish; Our Future' 
In October 2007, the Leaders of the Pacific Islands Forun1 adopted the Vava'u 
Declaration on Pacific Fisheries Resources Our Fish; Our Future,33 in which 
Leaders reaffirmed the importance of fisheries to the economies of all Pacific 
Forun1 countries, and committed to action on a number of key issues, including: 
Supporting and endorsing efforts by the Forum Fisheries Agency, supported by the 
Forum Secretariat, to take forward as a matter of urgency work to examine the 
potential for new multilateral Pacific regional arrangements patterned on the Niue 
Treaty Subsidiary Agreement n1odel for exchange of fisheries law enforcement data, 
cross-vesting of enforcement powers, and use of fisheries data for other law 
enforcement activities. 
Forum Leaders reiterated this commitn1ent in the .Pacific Plan in 2008,34 and 
again in the Communique issued by the 40th Fonnn Leaders Meeting in 2009. 
Noting the 'hiatus' in implementing this aspect of the Vava'u Declaration, Leaders 
specifically directed that Australia host a meeting of Ministers responsible for both 
fisheries and law enforcement/justice in 2010 and directed that, at that meeting: 
agreement is to be reached both on the fonn of new legal arrangements to be 
negotiated and on a roadmap for the negotiation process, which should conclude no 
later than the end of 2012. Leaders further instructed that Ministers report back to 
Leaders on progress at the 20 I 0 Leaders meeting, in the expectation that, at that 
time, Leaders will be able to endorse proposals put forward by Ministers on the form 
of arrangements to be negotiated and the details of what areas are to be covered by 
those arrangements, thereby allowing formal negotiations on the details to begin.35 
With the direction and timetable clearly prescribed by Leaders, the Ministers 
responsible for fisheries and law enforcement/justice met in Canberra in July 2010, 
and agreed that officials should negotiate a '1nultilateral Niue Treaty Subsidiary 
Agreement', to strengthen fisheries management in the region and provide a robust 
legal framework for more integrated, cost-effective and efficient maritime 
surveillance. 36 M"inisters directed that the work be undertaken by a Drafting Group 
under the auspices of the Parties to the Niue Treaty and that a draft text be 
con1pleted by the end of 2012 for consideration and appropriate endorsement by 
ministers,37 giving officials notice that they wanted this done, and done quickly. In 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
Annex B to the Communique of the 3gth Pacific Islands Forum meeting, Vava'u, 
Tonga, 16- 17 October 2007: <http://'Www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/ documents/forum-
communiques/>. 
Annex A to the Communique of the 39rh Pacific Islands Forum meeting, Alofi, Niue, 
19- 20 August 2009: <http://www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/documents/ forum-
communiques/>, pp 10- 1 1. 
40th Pacific Islands Forum, Cairns, Australia, 5--6 August 2009 at [18] - [19]: 
<http://www.forumsec.org/pages.cfm/documents/fon1m-communiques/>. 
'Outcome Statement'_, Joint Pacific Fisheries and Law Enforcement/Justice Ministers 
Meeting, 12- 23 July 2010, Canberra, [10] (copy on file with author). 
Ibid [ ll] and [12]. 
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addition, Australia announced that it had allocated AUD $2.4 million over three 
years to support the negotiation of the Agreement. 38 
Accordingl~, the FF A convened the first meeting of the NitW Tre~ Drafting 
Group in Honiara, Solomon Islands in August 2010. Consistent with Ministers' 
directions {and eight Drafting Group meetings and one table-top exercise later). the 
draft text produced by the Drafting Group was adopted by the Parties to the N.iuc 
Treaty on 2 November 2012, and the Agreement on Strengthening Implementation 
of the Niue Trea~ on C,ooperation in Fisheries Surveillance and Law Enforcement 
in the South Pacific Region was opened for signature. 
Ill. Substance of the Agreemen-t 
The Agreement provides a flexible mechanism for ·cooperation in two key areas; 
conducting fisheries surveillance and law enforcement activities, and s.barins 
fisheries data and intelligence for both fisheries and broader law enforcem(-'llt 
purposes. 
First, . it establishes a legal framework for the conduct of a wide range of 
cooperative surveillance and enforcement activities. The underlying premise is the 
establishment of a comprehensive, self-contained system that will ·enable the 
Parties to implement the Agreement and conduct cooperative activities directly, 
without the need for any further detailed. bilateral or multilateral .arrangem.etits. In 
order to give effect to this concept, the Agreement establishes an information 
managem.ent system (the Niue. Treaty Information System), which will be 
maintained by the Administrator. (the FFA). Parties wi11 provide the authority and 
infonnation necessary to engage in cooperative surveillance and enforcement 
activities to the Administrator, through a range of 'notifications'. This authority and 
. . 
information will be recorded in the Niue Treaty Information System, where the 
Parties will be· able to access it-electronically. · 
Second, the Agreement ,~stablishes ~ minimum standard for the exchange ~f 
fisheries data and 'intelligence, which will be stored and made available to all 
Parties in a fisheries information managem.ent system by the Administrator. It also 
enables the· Parties to share fisheries data and intelligence for broader law 
enforcement purpo.ses (ineludirtg ·with non-fisheries a~enc-ies and broader law 
enforcem·ent ~ganisatioi;is} and t& ·receive relevant information from broader law 
enforcement agencies or organisations. · 
. . The Agreement is 
1 
structUred in foµr Parts, followed by four Annexes. Io. 
accordanc~ with usual treaty practice, Parts I a~d IV address the genera{ treaty law 
and administrative issues, while Parts n · and HI contain most -of the sUbstantive 
rights an~ obligati<Jns~ The Atme~es cover minimum requirements for infonnation 
eJtchange (Annex A), tne role of tae Administrator (Anuex 8 ), the notifications to 
be used in pro:viding information and auth~rlty ~nder the Agi:eemem (Annex.€), 
3.8 ,. . . . . - . . .· . . . . . 
Hon. Tony Burke MP, Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, 'Ou.tcornes of 
the Pacific Ministers Meeting on Fisheries and Law Enf()rcement' (media release)<! 13 
.f uly 20 l O: <http://www .. rnaftgov.au/medi(_office/media _ releases/Burkt~edia· 
· releMes(201 O/june2/outco~s. _of_ the _pacific_ ministers_ meeting_ on:._tisberie1 _and_ 
law_ enforcement>. · · 
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and the flag that is to be flown during the conduct of operations under the 
Agreement (Annex D). 
(a) Part l- General provisions 
As is clear from its title and preamble, the Agreement is generally intended to 
strengthen the implementation of the Niue Treaty. Mo~e than this~ however,. it is 
designed to be a modem, innovative treaty through which the Parties can actively 
cooperate to enhance the reach and effectiveness of their resources, utilise current 
and emerging tools and technologies, and continuous!~ develop and implement 
national and international law. 39 This is reflected in the general introductory 
provisions in Part I, which include a number of new ideas and concepts unique to 
this Agreement. 
The central concept of a 'cooperative surveillance and enforcement activity ' is 
defined in a broad and flexible manner, in order to facilitate cooperation in the 
widest possible range of activities. 40 To ensure clarity about the role and authority 
of each Party in the conduct of these activities, the Agreement also provides 
definitions for 'Assisting Party' and 'Requesting Party', as well as the term 'cross-
vesting'. ~ 1 Although Leaders directed that the Agreement provide for the 'cross-
vesting' of enforcement powers,42 this is not a commonly used term with an 
.established meaning in international law. 43 In this Agreement, ~owever, it is used 
to describe personnel from an Assisting Party being appointed under the national 
law qf a Requesting Party as a person: authorised tQ exercise fisheries surveillance 
-and law enforcement functions on behalf of the Requesting Party. Since 
- information exchange is also central to the Agreeme.nt, separate terms have been 
coined to describe the two specific categories of information that will be provided 
or exchanged under the ~greement. All the authority and infof?lation necessary to 
conduct cooperative surveillance and enforcement activities under Part II will be 
provided through 'notifications', 44 as distinct from the raw or analysed data 
relating to fisheries provided under Part III of the Agreement, which is captured by 
the term 'fisheries data and intelligence'.45 
' The objective and application of the Agreement are broad and· policy-oriented, 
reflecting the regional a~d operational context in whi9,h it was. negotiated, and the 
shared ·interests of the FF A members in designing a . legal framework that will 
achieve practical outcomes. The objective is both ambjtious and purposive: to 
enhance active participation in cooperative surveill~nce and enforcement activities, 
with the ultimate purpose of continuously improving fisheries management and 
' I 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
See preambular paras 4-6. 
.A.rticle l(c). · 
Article l(a), (o) and (d), respectively. 
See the Vava 'ti Declaration, ~hove n 19. 
-The term 'cross-vesting' is most commonly used in domestic law with respect to the 
jurisdiction of courts. For example, the Jurisdiction ofCowts (Cross-vesting) Act 1987 
(Cth) (together with the complementary State legislation) provides for State courts to 
be vested with federal jurisdiction and for fedeTal courts to be vested with State 
jurisdiction. 
Article 1(1). 
Article I ( e ). 
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development, ensuring sustainable development of the region's fishery resources~ 
and maximizing the social and economic benefits. 46 To achieve this the Agreement 
can be applied as widely as its Parties desire; for such cooperative surveillance and 
enforcement activities as the Parties decide to conduct, and for the provision of 
such information and fisheries data and intelligence as the Parties decide to share. 47 
It is not geographically limited; cooperative surveillance and enforcement activities 
may be conducted both within the waters of a Party,48 or oo the high seas. 
Nonetheless, should a Party wish to specifically exclude the possibility of such 
activities taking place in certain of its maritime zones or defined areas, it can elect 
not to apply the Agreement with respect to those zones or areas by notification to 
the Administrator. 49 
Finally, Part I also establishes the basic mechanisms necessary for the operation 
of the Agreement: the National Authority, the Administrator, and the Niue Treaty 
Information System. The concepts of a 'national authority' and an Administrator 
are not unprecedented. However, in this Agreement these roles have been 
specifically designed in order to establish a 'self-contained' framework within 
which the Parties can cooperate without the need to enter into further Jegal 
arrangements. Accordingly, in addition to tbe usual roles performed by a central 
authority as a central conta,ct for administering the Agreement, 50 the National 
Authority has a number of functions pertaining to legal obligations under the 
Agreement, including submitting and updating the notifications which will provide 
the information and authority necessary for the conduct of cooperative surveillance 
and enforcement activities. 51 Similarly, the role of the Administrator will be crucial 
to the effective operation and implementation of the Agreement, as reflected in the 
specific direction that the Administrator play an 'active' role in assisting the Parties 
to achieve the objective of the Agreement. 52 In particular, the Administrator will be 
responsible for establishing and maintaining the Niue Treaty Information System, 
in which the authority and information provided through notifications will be 
recorded and made available as the basis for the conduct of cooperative 
surveillance and enforcement activities. 53 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
Article 2. 
Article 3(1 ). 
The term 'waters of a Party' is defined in Article l(p) to llleaJ,l the Exclusive Economic 
Zone, territorial sea, archipelagic waters and internal waters. 
Article 3(2). This provision could be used> eg, to exclude areas of overlapping or joint 
jurisdiction, or areas where th~ relevant coastal states already have alternative 
arrangements in place for smvetllance and enforcement (such as the Torres Strait 
Protected Zone). 
See the list in Article 5(4). 
See the list of functions in Article 5(3). 
Article 6(2). 
See the further discussion on the 'self-contained' nature of the system and the 
operation of the Niue Treaty Information System in Part IV(a) below. 
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(b) Part 11 _Cooperation in conducting cooperative surveillance and 
law enforcement activities 
Part II establishes the framework for Parties to condu~t coo~erativc surveillance 
and enforce1nent activities under the Agreement, tncludmg the means for 
requesting and providing assis~ance and. agreeing on the parameters. f~r :h~ conduct 
of activities. Since a 'cooperative surveillance and enforcement act1v1ty 1s defined 
as an activity undertaken 4pursuant to Part II of this Agreement', the possibilities 
for cooperation are really limited only by the needs and imagination of the Parties 
(and consistency with domestic and international law). Accordingly, the principles 
and procedures set out in Article 8 to govern cooperative surveillance and 
entbrce1nent activities have to be flexible enough to apply to the entire spectrum of 
potential activities, ranging from on-water enforcement operations invo1ving patrol 
boats, officers and aircraft, to in-port inspections or transshipment monitodng, 
provision of mutual legal assistance, and investigation or prosecution of a fisheries 
offence. The overriding requirements are that all cooperative surveillance and 
enforcetnent activities must be: consistent with the provisions of the Agreement 
itself; consistent with any applicable laws, policies or procedures notified or agreed 
by the relevant Parties; and based on the consent of each Party to the activity. 54 
In practice, each Party will provide information through an 'operational 
requirements notification' SS about: 
(i) the applicable laws, policies and procedures for the conduct of cooperative 
surveillance and enforcement activities in their waters, or using their resources 
(including operational procedures, use of force procedures, and policies for cost 
recovery and sharing of fines); and 
(ii) the assistance that the Party may be willing to make available for cooperative 
surveillance and enforcement activities (such as assets, personnel, particular 
expertise or other assistance). 
This information will be provided on a standing basis (and updated as necessary),56 
and stored in the Niue Treaty Information System, so that Parties can access it 
(including on a real-time basis) to plan and conduct cooperative surveillance and 
enforcement activities. 
Having accessed the information in the Niue Treaty Information System to 
undertake their planning, Parties will record their consent to a cooperative 
surveillance and enforcement activity in an 'activity notification'. 57 This must 
include any particular conditions on the conduct of the activity and be deposited 
with the Administrator in advance of its commencement. Notably, consent to a 
cooperative surveillance and enforcement activity can be provided on a standing 
?asis ~such as on-going agreement to cooperate in port inspections or the routine 
1ncl~s1on of. cross-vested officers on all maritime surveillance operations), for a 
specific period of time (such as six months or two years from the date of 
54 
55 
56 
57 
Article 8(1). 
Art~cle 8(2) and Annex C( 1 ). 
f_\rttcle 3(3)(a) requires the National Authority to submit and update notifications in a 
timely manner [emphasis added]. 
Article 8(3) and Annex C(3). 
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notification), or for a specific activity (such as one particular maritime surveillance 
operation or port inspection).58 . 
There are also specific requirements for the actual conduct of cooperative 
surveillance and enforcement activities, relating to authority, identification, use of 
force and hot pursuit. Prior to engaging in a cooperative surveiHance and 
enforcement activity, Parties must .ensure that all personnel and assets are 
appropriately authorised, and confirm this through notifications. 59 The Assisting 
Party must ensure that personnel participating iri the activity are appropriately 
authorised under its national law and inform the Administrator through an 
'authorised resources notification',60 and the Requesting Party must ensure that 
they are cross-vested with relevant powers under its national law and inform the 
Administrator through a 'cross· vesting notification'. 61 
Once authorised, personnel engaged in cooperative surveillance and 
enforcement activities must be appropriately identified, to ensure ·compliance with 
national and international law. In addition to the relatively standard requirement of 
a national identification card, personnel conducting sillveillance and enforcement 
activities on behalf of another Party must, if requested, produce an extract from the 
Niue Treaty Information System setting out . the extent of their· cross-vested 
authority under the laws of the Receiving Party. 62 This extract would be based on 
the information provided by the Requesting Party in its 'cross-vesting notifi~ation 
descnoing the authority that may be exercised by authorised personnel on its 
behalf. This concept uses technology to provide maximum flexibility in the conduct 
of cooperative surveillance and enforcement activities, while ensuring that an 
authorised personnel are appropriately idenfifiable. For example, the extract could 
be printed out from the Niue Treaty Information System in advance of an activity, 
printed out on board a patrol vessel during the· course of an activity, emailed to a 
patrol vessel or a fishing vessel by the National Authority or the Administrator, or 
even shown to a vessel master on an electronic device as an electronic document. 
There· is a clear legal framework for the use of force during cooperative 
surveillance and enforcement activities under the Agreeqient: 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
(i) force may only be used in the waters of a Requesting Party with that Party's 
consent · · · · 
(ii) any use of force must be consistent with the national laws, policies or procedures 
agreed in advance,63 and 
(iii) any use of force must be consistent with ititemational law. 64 
Article 8( 4 ). 
Article 10(2) and (3). 
Annex C(6). 
Annex C(5). 
Article l l(I)(a). 
Since the requirements for use of force during a cooperative· surveillance and 
enforcement activity are likely to differ between Parties, Parties must include 
infonnation about this in the operational requirements notification submitted to the 
Administrator pursuant to Article 8(2). In additiont use of force must be agreed 
between the Parties in· advance of any cooperative suiveillance and enforcement 
activity using the 'activity notification'. , 
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rn addltkln. Parties must seek to cooperate in tbe hot pursuit of fishing vessels 
to the ullten'.t consistent ·with their own national law and in accordance with 
intcmatio.nal law. 65 tbe Agrooment describes the .conditions and requirements for 
eondueting bot pursuitt and addresses the possibility for h_ot pursuit to be continued 
Jnto the territorial sea of another Party with the consent of that Party in a way that is 
clearly designed to· maximise the reach and effectiveness of jurisdiction and 
· resources, and to use current and emerging tools and technologies in innovative 
ways.66 
As pr~viously noted, the legal framework established by the Agreement is 
designed to enable the Parties to engage in an incredibly broad range of cooperative 
activities, extending well beyond the· traditionally understood 'at .. sea' enforcement 
activities. However, it specifically addresses two additional areas in which Parties 
may cooperate: investigation, enforcement and follow·up actions;67 and in-port 
activitie,s, including ROrt in~pections. 68 The types of cooperation envisaged in 
relation to investigation and follow-up actions. include collecting, managing and 
using evidencet conducting investigations, and providing mutual legal assistance. 
Such cooperation. may be sought with respect to fisheries offences under national 
~aw, violations of conservation and management measures of a Regional Fisheries 
Management Organisation (RFMO),. or any fisheries .. related aspects of broader 
transnationel crim~ investigation, a~d enforcement. activities. Notably, the Parties 
are also required to cqoperate. where appropriate, to enable the listing of fishing 
vessels on the Illegal, Vnrepprted and U~egulated (IUU) vessel lists of RFMOs. 69 
This does not require the Parties to support the listing of a vessel sought by another 
P~ .j,n all ciroum_gtances, but is intended to enco~rage and facilitate cooperation 
between. the Parties, as coastal states . 
• 
While the ipternational legal fram·ework for the law of the sea has always given 
primary jurisdicti~n. over governance ,· a~d· enfo!-cement to the flag state, 70 the 
~ctiltic& Qf a ~sy~tem ~at.re~ies prim.aril~ on flag state enforcement have become 
~ereasingty appa:rent. ~1 T~e rights accorded flag . states by . virtue of exclusive 
jurisdictio~' have not always been accompanied by aqequate fulfillment by flag 
sta~es of the corr~sponding duty to exe:rci~e ·effective ~ntr<;>l over flagged vessels. 72 
Factors . such as the use of flags of non--comp11anee~ and· ·the difficulties of 
undertaking higb s~as e~force~ent activities have made it necessary for states to 
consider alternative methods to combat ruU fishing. In this.regard, potentially one 
of the most effective tools that have been sugge$~d to c:o~bat . inadequate flag state 
65 
66 
Articl~ 12. 
Article 13(1 ). , 
~~~· 13(Z)t (4) and($). S~e. fijrth-er discu~sion onJio~ ,putsuit in Part IV(b) and (c) 
67 Article l S. ' 
68 Article 16. · 
69 
.Article l5(6). ~~ UNCLQS .Article !12(1). , . , -; . . 
For a ~h~~pful overv~e.w of . this problem. see R :R.a~e~ 'The · Anthropocen.e, Au.toPo~~sis ~ the Dismgenuouaness of the Genuine Link' above n 6 
UNCLOS Atticle 9 l. , · ' · · 72. 
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t.mf r ' 1\1 nt is that f port $tnt\; control - requiring port tates to prevent IUU 
fighi ng \1css 'l fton1 u~ ing th 'ir port to I.and, transship or proce. fish and to deny 
su ·h \' 'sseL :l ·ccss t other p rt ervi es. Port st~tc juri diction i grounded in the 
gi:ncmll J ncc:cpt "d principle of international law that a state ·exercises full 
S\;\'Cr~igut o ~r it p rt be au e they lie wholly within its territory. 73 
R ·t1e titl ' thi · growing international reco&rnition that the presenc-0 of fi hing 
vcs~c ls in port pro ide igni ficant opportunities for fisheries surveilJancc and 
t.:nforc ~rn nt, 74 th Agreement include , a pro vi ion on port inspections. Pattie may 
cnrry out in .. port activitie at the request of another Party or permit personnel from: 
un th r Party to conduct Monitoring ontrol and Surveillance (MCS) activities in 
their p rt. This ·could include monitoring landing or transshipment operations, 
in p cting a fl bing vessel, or taking enforcement action such as seizing catch or 
holding a e. cl in port while an investigation is undertaken. Such port inspections 
and other port-ha ed MCS activities are yet another toglfue Parties can draw upon 
to rnn* imi e the operational reach and effectiveness of the jurisdiction and 
re ·our e. available to the1n. 
The final article of Part II address the financial issues associated with 
urvcillance and enforcement activities, which are particularly important to Small 
Island Developing States with limited resources to support costly at-sea operations. 
The Agreement e tablishes the rules to be applied in relation to payment terms and 
co t recovery for the involvement of resources in cooperative surveillance and 
enforcen1ent activities,75 as well as the sharing of fines and monies recovered from 
fisherie offences detected or investigated through cooperation under the 
Agreement. 76 In both cases, Parties must try resolving these issues through 
agreement, but there is a default procedure that is to be followed if agreement can 
not be reached. This is designed to provide as much certainty as possible about the 
co t that Parties are likely to incur in undertaking a cooperative surveillance and 
enforcement activity and minimise the potential for disagreement over these issues. 
(c) Part 111- Cooperation in sharing fisheries data and :intelligence 
Part Ill addresses cooperation in sharing fisheries data and intelligence, giving 
effect to the direction from. Leaders that the Agreement should enhance cooperation 
in this area.77 As noted above, 'fisheries data and inteUigence' is a distinct category 
of information under the Agreement; it encompasses any data or intelligence 
relating to fisheries that is provided or made available pursuant to Part III, which 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
UNCLOS Article 25(2). 
Even prior to the conclusion of the Port State Measures Agreement (see above n 2 and 
accompanying text), specific provisions with respect to port state measures were 
included in the Compliance Agreement, the Fish Stocks Agreement and the fPOA-
lUU. Such measures have also been put in place by a number of regional fisheries 
management organisations (see., inter a/ia: Indian Ocean Tuna Commission Resolution 
10/1 l; . Inter-Amer!can Tropical ~a Comn1ission Resolution C--04--04 and 
R~.0Iut1on C-05--07~ and the Comm.1ss1on for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
L1vmg Resource CM- 10-06 and CM- 10-07). 
Article 17. 
Article 18. 
See above nn 33-35. 
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d. t' t types of data sharing: (i) sharing of data for fisheries addresses two is inc 
d ( .. ) . h nge of data for broader law enforcement purposes. purposes; an 11 exc a . . . . . 
P · already required to exchange some data under Article v of Although art1es are . · . 
h N. T ty and ' 'arious FF A members exchange data with some or all other t e 1 ue rea . , " · . 
b ant to existing arrangements, there are a number of gaps and mem ers pursu · 
· · t · · the current framework. The Agreement addresses this by mcons1s enc1es in . . . 
establishing a comprehensive framework. req~1nng aH. Part1~s to exchange. a 
minimum standard of fisheries data and intelhgence (hsted i~ Annex A) with 
respect to foreign fishing vessels, domestic fishing vessels auth.onsed to fish on ~he 
high seas, and the activities of natural or legal pers~ns rel~tlng to those fishmg 
vessels. 78 All fisheries data and intelligence thus provided w1ll be managed by the 
Administrator using the information management facility and made available to a11 
Parties for fisheries purposes, in accordance with security standards and data 
sharing protocols adopted by the Forum Fisheries Committee or such other 
standards and protocols as the Parties to the Agreement may adopt. 
The fisheries data and intelligence listed in Annex A were selected on the basis 
of their importance to support MCS activities, specifically: vessel license lists; 
location, activities and movement of fishing vessels (including vessel monitoring 
system data, observer data, boarding reports, port inspection reports and vessel 
sighting reports); operational catch and effort data; vessels and persons of interest, 
and prosecutions, violations and settlements relating to fisheries. Specific 
requirements are also included with respect to the timing and formats for providing 
the various types of fisheries data and intelligence. Of interest, Annex A specifies 
geographic limits so that fisheries data and intelligence need only be provided 
where it is with respect to, or relevant to, the Party's Exclusive Economic Zone or 
the high seas in the W estem and Central Pacific Ocean. This limit is necessary to 
ensure that only the fisheries data and intelligence most relevant to the Parties is 
provided, and that the extent of data and intelligence that must be provided under 
the Agreement is manageable and not without limit. 
In addition, the Agreement establishes a mechanism for Parties to share 
fisheries data and intelligence with each other for use in broader law enforcement 
contexts - such as transnational crime or immigration investigations. 79 This gives 
effect to the mandate fr~m Leaders (which is also reflected in the objective) that the 
Agreement should provide for the use of fisheries data for other law enforcement 
. . . . 80 . 
activities. · Finally, the Administrator may also receive information from broader 
law enfo~cement .organisations (such as the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Policy, or the 
Transnational C~me Centre) and share it with the Parties for use in a fisheries 
context, 
81 
reflectmg the statement by Ministers that information generated through 
78 
79 
80 
81 
Article 19. 
Article 20( 1 ). 
See. the Vava'u Declaration above n 33 
Arttcle20(4). ' · 
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law enforcement channels and shared with fisheries agencies could strengthen 
fisheries protection. 82 
( d) Part IV - Final provisions 
Part IV includes all the final clauses usually found in a treaty and (as with Part I) 
includes a number of new ideas designed to suite the unique circumstances of this 
Agreement, particularly with. respect to cooperation with non·Parties, taking 
decisions by electronic ·means, and a simplified procedure for amending the 
Annexes. 
Consistent with the idea of enhancing active cooperation, the Parties must seek 
to cooperate with non-Parties to advance the objective of the Agreement, 
particularly non-Parties that are surveillance and enforcement partners or coastal 
states and territories in the region. 83 Key surveillance and enforcement partners are 
likely to include the United States and France, who regularly participate in 
cooperative surveillance and enforcement activities with the FF A members. 84 The 
form and nature of cooperation with non-Parties is not limited, and may occur 
however the Parties see fit (including on an individual or collective basis). The 
Administrator may facilitate the sharing of information provided, collected or made 
available under the Agreement with both non-Parties and inter-governmental 
organisations, provided that the relevant Parties consent. 85 This would enable 
information to be shared not only with surveillance and enforcement partners, but 
potentially with regional law enforcement agencies or other relevant inter-
governmental organisations (ranging, for example, from the Pacific Islands Chiefs 
of Police to the WCPFC). 
Although the Agreement provides a mechanism for the Parties to meet, 86 in 
light of the numerous existing fora in which FF A members already meet 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
'Outcome Statement' above n 22, [17]. Ministers also noted that the Pacific Islands 
Forum Regional Security Committee should 'continue to work on a parallel process to 
determine how law enforcement agencies best utilize fisheries information and share 
maritime security information within our region' (at [ 16]). 
Article 21. 
For example, both the US and France participated in the regional surveillance and 
enforcement operation Kurukuru in November 2012, including through the provision 
of two patrol boats, a frigate and two surveillance aircraft by the French Government, 
and a Coast Guard vessel and two surveillance aircraft by the US Government (see 
FFA Circular · 121112, 20 November 2012: <http://www.tongafish.gov.to/ 
documents/Home/press%20release%20FF A/Circulat°/o20Ref>/o2012 112%20Press 
%20Release%20pdf>/o20version.pdt>). The US also has a number-of bilateral ~ship­
rider' agreements with Pacific Island Countries, see Cmdr Andrew Norris, 'Bilateral 
Agreements: They're not just for drugs anymore' in Proceedings of the Marine Safety 
& Security Council, the Coast Guard Journal of Safety at Sea, Summer 2009, pp 70-
73: <www.uscg.mil/proceedings>. 
Consent must be provided by the Party providing the inf-onnation, the Party on whose 
behalf the information was collected and any Party to whose waters the infonnation 
relates (Article 21(3)). 
Article 22. 
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regularly,87 the Parties are encouraged to use electronic meru:is as ~uch as possible 
for the impletnentation and operation of the Agreement, 1nclud1ng through the 
distribution of circulars by the Administrator, and the taking of decisions by 
electronic means. To facilitate this, the Agreement establishes a specific method for 
taking a decision electronically, whereby if no Party has objected to a proposed 
decision within a thirty-day period, it is deemed to have been adopted. 88 However, 
if one or more objections are notified during that period, the proposed decision is 
not deemed to be either accepted or rejected, but will be considered at the next 
meeting of the Parties. This process has the benefit of enabling simple and efficient 
electronic agreement if possible~ while providing flexibility for a proposed decision 
to 'be referred for discussion at a meeting of the Parties if necessary. 
Since the Annexes form an integral part of the Agreement, the requirements 
detailed in the Annexes (such as the fisheries data and intelligence to be provided 
under Part III, listed in Annex A, and the information and authority to be provided 
in notifications, listed in Annex C) have the same legally binding status as the text 
within the Articles of the Agreement. 89 Nonetheless, since they may need to be 
amended or updated more regularly than other provisions of the Agreement (to 
reflect changing operational needs or technological developments, and ensure that 
the Agreement operates as effectively as possible) there is a simplified amendment 
procedure for the Annexes. 90 Once again, this procedure, which is a combinatjon of 
electronic decision-making and 'tacit acceptance', is designed to enable simple and 
efficient electronic agreement if possible, while providing flexibility for the Parties 
to meet and discuss a proposed amendment if necessary. 
Accordingly, amendments to the Annex.es may be proposed at any time in 
writing to the Administrator,91 and must be adopted by consensus.92 There is a 
sixty. .. day period within which, if any Party notifies an objection to the proposed 
amendment, it will be deemed to have been rejected. However, if two or more 
Parties so request in writing, the proposed amendment will neither considered to be 
adopted nor rejected, but will be considered at the next meeting of the Parties. In 
practice, the electronic process .is likely to apply principally for simple 
amendments, while any more complex or technical proposals might require 
discussion at a meeting of the Parties. For example, rather than simply accepting or 
rejecting. an ame~dme?t as proposedi a P~ may wish to propose slightly different 
amendments. This might be most effective y ac 1eved through discussion at a 
meeting of the Parties, rather than repeated circulation of alternative electronic 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
Inclu.ding: the Foru~ Fisheries ~ommittee (which meets multiple times each year), the 
meetings of the Part1es to.the N~uc Treaty, an~ t~e meetings of the WCPFC (of which 
·t~cre ~c three each y~ar, includtn~ the Comm1ss1on, the Scientific Committee and the 
Technical and Comphance Committee). ' 
Arth~Jc 23. 
Article 25(1 ). 
Article 26. 
Article 26( 1 ). 
Article 26(2). 
. 
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proposals. Once adopted an amendment to an Annex enters into force sixty days 
following adoption (without the need for ratification, acceptance or approval).93 
The Agreement is subject to ratification; approval or acceptance by the 
signatories,94 and will enter into force following the fourth ratification, acceptance 
or approval.95 However, only states that are Party to the Niue Treaty (or a territory 
of a state which is Party to the Niue Treaty which has been so authorised by the 
Government of the state which is internationally responsible for it )96 may become 
Party to the Agreement, unless all the Parties to the Agreement otherwise agree. 97 
IV. 'Innovative features' of the Agreement 
The Agreement bas been described as having 'innovative features that reflect and 
promote key developments in international law in the fight against illegal, 
unreported and unregulated fishing' ,98 and a number of themes emerge from the 
overview of the Agreement above which give strength to this observation. First, the 
Agreement establishes a self-contained system, which goes beyond simply 
describing a legal 'framework' and provides a detailed, _prescriptive mechanism 
that the Parties can use to 'op.erationalise' the cooperative activities that it 
envisages. Second, it makes a wide range of flexible and innovative types of 
cooperation available to the Parties, on an 'opt-in' basis that seeks to actively 
facilitate cooperation, but does not mandate it. And third, it makes practical use of 
current and emerging tools and technologies to maximise the effectiveness of the 
Parties' limited resources and their jurisdiction under intemational law. 
(a) A self-contained system. for cooperation 
The idea of cooperative surveillance and enforcement is not new - it was a key 
element of the Niue Treaty over twenty years ago. However, providing a legal 
framework allowing Parties to enter into cooperative activities is not enough; 
consideration .must also be given to how the Parties will actually implement the 
framework and give it operational effect. At the most basic level, this is a question 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
Article 26(3). In contrast, amendments to the Agreement itself do require ratification, 
acceptance or approval, and do not enter into force until the Administrator has received 
such instrmnents from all Parties-(see Article 27(3)). However, Article 27(5) provides 
that the Parties will, to the extent possible, apply the amendment provisionally This 
will enable Parties to benefit from amended or updated provisions as soon as possible, 
while acknowledging that it may take some time for all Parties to finalise the domes ti~ 
procedures necessary to ratify, approve or accept an amendment to the Agreement. 
Article 28(2). 
Article 29(1). 
This provision applies with respect to !okelau,, which is a non-se~f .. governing territory 
of New Zealand and does not have an mtetnational legal personality separate from that 
of~ew Zeal~. H?wev:r, To~elau participates fully and in its own right in a range of 
regi.~nal orgaruzattons including the FF A e: <http://www. mfat. govt.n7.l'Co"Untries/ 
Pac1ficffokelau.php>. , 
Article 28( l ), (3) and {4 ). 
Sen~tor the ~on ~o~ Carr, _Minister fo~ Foreign Aff~irs~ 'Strengthening protection of 
Pacific fishenes' (jol~t media rele~e ~1th the Hon Std Sidebottom MP,. Parliamentary 
S~cr-etary for Agnculture, F1shenes and Forestry), 8 November 2012 <h~p://www.psmaff.gov.aU/media·rele~es/2012/november/strengthening .. protection- , 
pac1fic-fishenes>. Accessed on 25 Apnl 2013. · 
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of how the legal authority required to carry o~t a cooperative ~tivity will be given 
d ec· rded (tot exan'lple how one Party will formally authonse another Party to ~ 0~1 enforcement activities and .exercise j~sdiction in i~ waters o~ on its 
bebali). Beyond this there are a 1nyr1ad of other issues on which the Parties to a 
cooperative actjvity will need to agree, ranging from the p~ocedur.~s for t~e use of 
force~ and the comn1and and control of assets, to the authonty that is exercisable by 
cross-vested personnel and the procedures that must be followed to carry out a 
boarding and inspection operation. 
In the Niue Treaty, actual cooperation is dependent on the Parties entering into 
further subsidiary agreements in order to provide the requisite consent and agree on 
these other issues.99 This leaves a great deal of uncertainty with respect to a wide 
range of operational issues including command and control, the extent of authority) 
the use of force and the conduct of hot pursuit, all of which need to be resolved 
before any active cooperation can take place. In practice, this level of legal 
uncertainty is likely to be outside the comfort zone of the fisheries officers usually 
responsible for organizing cooperative surveillance and enforcement activities, 
which is reflected in the sm.all number of subsidiary agreements which have been 
concluded.loo As a result, the lack of prescription in the Niue Treaty itself has 
reduced its use and effectiveness, and led to the majority of regional surveillance 
and enforcement operations being managed outside the Niue Treaty framework.101 
In contrast this Agreement is intended to establish a comprehensive self-contained 
system for cooperatio.n in fisheries surveillance and law enforcement, which will 
enable the Parties to implement this Agreement directly, without the need for any 
further detailed bilateral or multilateral arrangements . 
. To ~o this, . the A~eeroe~t establishes two key concepts: the system of 
notifications which Parties will use to provide the authority and information 
n~cessary to conduct ~ooperative surveillance and enforcement activities, and the 
Niue Treaty lnform~tton System in which this information and authority will be 
store~ and m~de avatl~ble. These two concepts are designed to ensure that authority 
and 1nfonnan.on required under the Agreement is properly giv-e . d d · l d · · r. n, recor e . m a 
c ear 8;11 consistent J.Onn, stored securely, kept up to date, and mad 'bl to 
authonsed personnel fro h p e access1 e · m eac. arty. 
Notifications serve two key purposes First they pro 'd ,,~ .c. . • . 
th . . · ' · · v1 e in1ormat1on" about e resources or other forms of assistance that a Party b . . . 
d th. A - . . may e wtlhng to provide un er . e greement, any condit10ns on the use of th . . . 
policies and procedures relevant to their participation ?se resources: and an~ laws, 
and enforcement activity. The bulk of th' . _ ~ in. a cooperat1ve surveillance is tnJ.ormatton will I d b provided once, and then updated as necessary Thi .. 11 . . on Y nee · to e 
_......_ _ _ _ ~--.. -· _ __ · s Wt include things like: what 
99 See Michael Lodge, above n 18, 281. 
JOO See above n 20. 
lOl For ex~le, th~ only Niue Treaty subsidi a . . 
cooperative surveillance and enforcement t9!"t gr~ment used as a basis for 
Novernber 2012 (whic~ oovcred the Exclus~~v;~o dur~g Operation KuruKuru in 
m.embers. and resuJted 111 323 vessels being sighted nonuc Zones of almost all FF A 
trilateral agreement between the Federated States of ~d 206 ~essels boarded) was the 
the Marshall Islands (see FFA Circular 12/112, ,20 N~ctonesi.a, Palau and Republi~ of 
ember 2012, above n 84). 
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vessels, aircraft, systems or personnel a Party is willing to make available for 
cooperative activities, under what conditions, and any relevant laws, policies or 
procedures that are applicable; what rules of command and control would apply; 
and what expertise or training a Party may be able to provide. 102 
Second, notifications provide the "authority" that will constitute the legal basis 
for the conduct of such activities (such as permission to exercise enforcement 
jurisdiction in the waters of another Party, or to continue hot pursuit into the 
territorial sea of another Party).103 Accordingly, the form and content of the 
notifications is very important. In order to ensure that the extent of the authority 
provided through any notification is clear, and that the information is provided to a 
consistent standard, Annex C prescribes the form in which the various notifications 
required under the Agreement must be submitted.104 The Agreement is drafted 
broadly enough to provide for notifications to be submitted in either paper or 
electronic fo~ but over time it is likely that this process will be integrated into the 
Niue Treaty Information System, so that information can be provided through 
online submission or direct electronic entry. 
The information and authority provided in notifications will be stored and made 
available in the Niue Treaty Information System, which will be a secure, searchable 
online information management system, accessible by the Parties in real-time.105 
Parties will be able to access the infonnation in this System to make plans for, 
request assistance with, or consent to engage in cooperative surveillance and 
enforcement activities. In addition, authorised personnel will be able to use the 
System in the course of a cooperative surveillance .and enforcement activity 
(including to verify relevant laws, policies and procedures, seek additional 
authority, or print out extracts confirming the cross-vested authority of authorised 
officers). 
How will this operate in practice? A Requesting Party will search the 
information in the System to see what assistance might be available from potential 
Assisting Parties to meet their particular needs, and any applicable conditions or 
laws, policies and procedures of the Assisting Party. Having ascertained what 
assistance it needs, the Requesting Party can discuss and· agree on the parameters of 
the activity with the relevant Assisting Party, record this in an activity notification 
and submit it to the Administrator for inclusion in the Niue Treaty Information 
System. The legal authority for the Parties to conduct the activity is then provided 
by the Agreemen~ itse~f, as stated in ~icle 7(4): 'the authority provided by each 
Party through nobficatlons to the Admm1strator shall constitute a legal basis for the 
cond~ct of the activities .au~orised, requested or approved therein'. By providing a 
sufficient level of prescnpt1on, supported by a central repository of infonnation and 
authority, .this self-i;ontained s.ystem aims to o~er~ome the problems of the past, 
and establish a legal and practical framework with.in which Parties will be able to 
actively cooperate with ease and confidence. 
102 See Annex C(l). 
103 Article 7(4). 
I04 Article 7(2). 
105 Article 7(3) and (5). 
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(b) Flexible. forms of assistance and an 'opt·in' 
The Agreement is intentionally structured to be very flexible, so that Parties 
cooperate as ~ch ?t as little as they lik~, a~~ in ~he ~roadest possible rangec~~ 
activities. While this n1ay seem counter, .. 1ntu1t1ve t.n hght of the self-contained 
prescript~ve na~e of the system just. descri~ed, this actual.ly facilitates flexibility: 
by enabhng Parties to select the specific assistance they will offer or seek and the 
~onditions laws, policies or proc-edures which will apply, and to access this 
information to plan and conduct cooperative activities. This 'opt-in' system is also 
likely to make it easier for countries to ratify or accede to the Agreement, since the 
only direct obligation that they would assume on becoming Party is to provide the 
min_imum standard of fisheries data and intelligence required under Article 19. It 
also allows the Agreement to include a range of additional features, which Parties 
may choose whether or not to use, depending on their individual needs, interests, 
laws, policies and procedures. 
_ The ftrst of these is the possibility for Parties to request a wide range of 
assistance under the Agreement, extending well beyond the traditional realm of 
'joint patrols' · involving' vessels, aircraft and personnel. The 'operational 
requirements notification, 106 requires each Party to list the types of assistance that 
it may make available as part of a cooperative surveillance and enforcement 
activity, within the categories of 'monitoring', 'control' and 'surveillance'. In 
addition to the standard areas such as aerial and at-sea patrols, Parties could offer 
assistance in the form of training,. such as how to analyse compliance data, conduct 
boarding and inspection operations, or collect and manage evidence. Alternatively, 
Parties may be able to provide personnel with relevant expertise, such as MCS 
analysts or trained observers, ·or to help with the establishment of a vessel 
monitoring system or vessel registry and licensing system. Since the types of 
assistance . which max be offered or req11ested are not limited, this flexible 
framework will also be able to evolve over time to meet the needs and priorities of 
its Parties, and the ever-changing tools and technologies required for effective 
fisheries MCS. · 
In addition to seeking assistance from other Parties, the Agreement also enables 
Parties to authorise or request support from FF A personnel in implementing the 
Agreement. I 07 This could range from authorizing personnel in the FF A Regional 
Fisheries Surveillance Centre to identify, monitor and track vessels when requested 
(such as dwing hot pursuit}, to assistance with port inspections or the monitoring of 
transshipment operations. Alternatively, it could be used to request FF A personnel 
to provide training on how -to carry .out cooperative surveillance and enforceJJle~t 
activities under the Agreement (such as training officers from an Assisting Party 111 
the practices and procedures of a Requesting Party, so that they can be cross-vested 
and exercise authority under the laws of the Requesting Party). This may prov~ t~ 
be a useful avenue for capacity building in relevant areas, and enhance the P~1:s 
overall ability to participate in cooperative surveillance and enforcement activities 
under the Agreement. 
106 Annex C( 1 ). 
107 See Article 10(6). 
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Beyond the concept .of 'assistance',. the Agreement also establishes the 
possibility for one Party (as a flag state) to give consent for another Party (or 
Parties) to board and inspect its flagged vessels on the high seas (subject to any 
conditions or requirements the flag state wishes . to impose). 108 This provision 
builds on the high seas boarding and inspection regime establ.ished in th~ Fish 
Stocks Agreement and the high seas boarding and inspection procedures in which 
FF A memb~rs already participate through the WCPFc.109 ·once again, since this is 
an 'opt-in'· ~echanism, it does not impose an obligation on the Parties. Rather, it 
simply. provides an option that Parties may make use of if th~y choose, and is 
another practical way in which the Agreement seeks to. encourages active 
cooperation between the Parties., . 
In the same way, the Agreement provides a inechaaism for one Party (as a 
coastal state) to provide con.sent for another Party (or Parties) to continue hot 
pursuit into, its territorial sea (subject to any conditions the coastal state Party may 
wish to impose).110 This mechanism relates to the provision in Article 111(3) of the 
UNCLOS that the right of hot pursuit ceases when the ship pursued eQters the 
territorial sea of its own or a third state . . A strict interpr~tation of this req~iremen.t 
provides for a rather large loophole in the effectiveness of hot pursuit, since any 
vessel subject to hot p\irsuit can take refuge .in the territorial sea of a third state and 
effectively end the pursuit. The use of this loophole to undermine the effectiveness 
of the right of ho1 pursuit has been clearly demonstrated in the So~them Ocean; 
where vessels pursued by Australian authorities in relation to violations committed 
in the Exclusive Economic Zone around Heard and McDonald Islands have sought 
to end the pursuit by entering the French territorial ~ea. 111 There ·is evidence that 
instructions were provided to these vessels during the course of the hot pursuit, 
which allowed them to deliberately take action, to avoid apprehension by entering 
the French tettitorial sea.112 · 
To .address this loophole, the Agree~ent enables ·coastal states to provide 
consent for o.ther Parties to cont41ue hot pursuit in their territorial sea. This is 
desig;ned to prevent vessels . escaping or undermining a legitimate :hot pursuit by 
talcing refuge in the territorial sea of another Party. Similar provisions ate found in 
several exis~ing fisheries surveillance and ·enforcemen~ agreements, includh1g some 
existing subsidiary a:~eements. under the Niue Treaty,113 ·a bilateral agree~ent 
. . 
l 08 Article 10(7)3 . 
109 cc . See Article 26 of the WCPF onvenoon and C:MM.2006-08.; .'Westem and Central 
Pacific f.isheries Commissi.on · Bom,:ding and Inspection Procedures' adopted 15 
Decemher.2006: <http://www.wcpfc.intl>. 
110 Article 13(2). · -
111 For example, the arrest of the Lena in 2002 and the South To.,ni in 2601. See R Baird 
' Attests in a Cold Climate (Part 2) - Shaping Hot Pursuit through State Practiee: 
(2009) Antarctic and Southern Ocean .Law and Policy Ocea-sional Papers, 1.3, pp 1- 21 
at 13. · . -. _ . · · . 
112 Ibid. 113 
· See the trilateral :agceement between: the Federated. Sta~es of 'Mia:onesi~ the Republic 
- of th.e Marsh.all Islands and Palau, and .fhe bilateral agreementS betwee,n the~ Cook 
Islands and Niue, and the Cook Islands ,and S~ above n 17 . . 
• t - ,... 
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between Australia and France, 114 and a multilateral agreement between ~ 
. . . . . . several 
West African States. fl~ While some commentators agree that-is a practical sol t' 
. . . 111 f th UNCTO ·S 116 th. . . u IOI) 
not inconsistent with Article . o e ~ .v , ts issue ts not free from 
debate.117 
· The inclusion of this provisi-0n in the Agreement reflects its moder 
progressive approach to fisheries enforcemen~ and commitment to maximizing th~ 
reach and effectiveness of jurisdiction and resources. 118 While there is support for 
this approach to bot pursuit in academic commentary, and in the provisions of 
bilateral and regional ~greements, the practical use of this provision wilJ provide 
the moSt concrete evidence of the status of this interpretation of Article 1 J 1 of the 
UNCLOS~ In any case, for now, since Parties may choose whether or not to 'opt-.in' 
. to this aspect of the A:greement, each Party may interpret and use this provision in a 
manner consistent with its national laws,. policies and procedures, and its views on 
tbe interpretation and state of development of international law. 
(c) U~ and development of cu~nt anif emerging tools and 
technologies 
. 
The Agreement specifically. r~ognises the · Parties~ intention to 'continuously 
develop and use current and emerging tools and technologies to combat illegal, 
unreported and unregulated fishing, including through the progressive development 
and implementation of national and international laws' .119 The focus on 'future-
proofing~ is evident throughout the text, 120 and it is clear ~t a range of features 
114 Treaty between the Government of Australia and the Government of the French 
Republic 011 Cooperation iri Maritime Areas A<lj.acent to the French Southern and 
Antarctic Territories (TAAF), Heard Island and the McDonald Islands [2005] ATS 6, 
adopted in Canberra, Australia, 24 November 2003, entered into force I February 2005 
(Article 4 ). 
115 Convention on Sub-Regional Cooperation in the Exercise of Maritime Hot Pursuit, 
ll6 
between Cape Verde, The Gambi~ Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania and Senegal 
done in Conakry, Republic of ' Guinea, r September 1993: 
<http;//www.itlos.'0rglindex.php7id~252>. · · · ' 
See, inter alia; RR Churchill and AV Lowe, The Law of the Sea (3rd ed, 1999, 
Manchester University Press) 215; C H .Allen, 'Doctrine of Hot Pµrsuit: a Functional 
In,terpretation Adaptable tO ~merging Maritime La~ Enforcement Technologies and 
Practices', .(1989) 20 Ocean Dev. & lnt'l L. 309-41 at 320; D Guilfoyle, Shipping 
Interdiction and t~ Law of the Sea, (2009, Camb'ridge University Press) at 145; 
R Baird, •IJlegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing: An Analysis of the Legal, 
Economic and Historical Factors Relevant to its Development and Persistence t, (2004) 
5 Melbourne Journal of International Law 299 at 329. 
117 See, eg, T Aqorau, 'Analysis of the responses of the Pacifzc Island States ,to the 
.fisheries provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention' ( 199-8) Doctor of Philosophy 
thesis, Centre for Natural Resources Law and Policy, University of Wollongong, at 
238-:39: <ltttp://ro .. uow.ed\Lau/theses.1993>. 
See preatDbular paras 4 and 5 and Article 2(a) 
Preamb~ para 4: . . . . d E~I~ mcl~. the use of electromc information manage·ment systems to r7~or 
aDd ~ infonnation; rhe ability to use those systems in real -ti.me to faciltta!e 
~e surv~ce. and enforcement activities (including by producing e~ectron~c 
evidence of autbonsation ); . 1he requirement that the An:Dexes be contuluoUS Y 
4eveloped ·and updated; and the simplified amendment procedure for the Arlllexes 
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have consciously been included which will enable the Agreement to be adapted 
over time to incorporate and reflect new tools and technologies. 
One of the best examples of the way in which the Agreement gives effect to this 
commitment is the provision on hot pursuit.121 As noted by one commentator: 
aspects of the traditional doctrine of hot pursuit are .largely founded on assumptions 
better suited to the era of local fisheries, three-mile territorial seas, and observation 
by long glass than to the current era characterized by distant-water fleets of factory 
trawlers, 200-mile exclusive economic zones, and observation by radar, aerial 
photography, underwater sensors and satellites. 122 
In this regard, the Agreement seeks to give a good faith interpretation to the 
requirements of the 'traditional doctrine' encapsulated in Article 111 of the 
UN CLOS, while enabling Parties to make full use of modem tools and technology. 
Article 13( 4) of the Agreement provides that hot pursuit commences when the 
appropriate authorities have good reason to believe that a vessel has violated the 
laws of the Party within whose waters the vessel is detected (either based upon 
direct visual contact, or evidence obtained by 'reliable technical means'), and a 
clear signal to stop has been given to the vessel. Similarly, Article 13(5) provides 
that hot pursuit shall be deemed to have continued without interruption, provided 
that continual positive identification and tracking of the pursued vessel is 
maintained by resources authorised under this Agreement by the Party in whose 
waters the vessel was detected, including by either direct visual contact, or 'reliable 
technical means' . 
Consistent with Article 111(1) of the UNCLOS, these provisions require that: 
(i) the vessel be located within the relevant Party' s waters; (ii) the Party have a 
' good reason to believe' the vessel has violated relevant laws; (iii) a clear signal to 
stop is given; and (iv) the pursuit be continued without interruption. However, the 
Agreement provides for the authorities to base their belief that a vessel has violated 
the laws of the coastal state, and to maintain positive identification and tracking, on 
the basis of 'reliable technical means~. While this term is not defined, it would 
presumably include vessel monitoring systems, satellite images or radar, or any 
other forms of reliable technology that may be developed - such as unmanned 
aerial vehicles, for example. This functional approach, 123 which is similar to a 
provision in a bilateral Australia-France fisheries enforcement treaty, 124 arguably 
strikes a workable balance between the strict textual requirements of the UN CLOS 
and the practical reality of fisheries surveillance and enforcement in the 21 ;. 
century. 
which wi~l enable notifications to be updated as re.quired to reflect new tools and 
technologies. 
121 See preambular para 5. 
122 CH Allen, above n 116, 310. 
123 Ibid 322. 
124 A greement. on Cooperative Enforcement of Fisheries Laws between the Government 
of .Australia and the Government of the French Republic in the Maritime Areas 
Adjacent to the French Southern and Antarctic Territories, Heard Island and 
~cDonald Islands, [2011] ATS 1, adopted in Paris, France, I August 2007 ,entered 
mto force 1 July 2011 (Article 4). ' 
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In addition, the Agreement requires that positive tracking and identification be 
maintained hy resources 'authorized under this Agreement by the Party in whose 
waters the vessel was detected' )25 ln light of the flexible opt~ons for cooperative 
surveillance and enfo.rcement provided in the Agree.ment, tlus could potentially 
include n,0t only the resources of that Party, but p ersonnel from an Assist-ing Party 
or Ff A personnel located in the Regional Fisheries and Surveillance Centre, 
provided they are appropriately authorised by the relevant coastal state pursuant to 
Article 1 o. Combined with the ability to harness 'reliable technical means•) this 
approach ·could have enormous practical benefits) in a. region of vast maritime 
zones containing valuable natural resources belonging to countries w.ith very 
limited enforcement assets~ For example, it has re<;ently bee~ reported that Palau 
(which bas an exclusive economic z-0ne of around 630,000 km- and only one patrol 
boat) plans to use drones to monitor its commercial fishing ban - a development 
which allows further food for thought regarding the potential use to which this 
provision could be put.126 
V. Process of negotiating the Agreement 
Finally, it. is useful to briefly describe the process that was used to develop the 
Agreement because, although commonly understood in a domestic context, it was 
rather unusual in . an international treaty negotiation (and may provide a useful 
template for others to consider). 
(a) The circumstances: commitment, common interest and costs 
I~ is important to begin by noting SO'fne of the key 'enabling' circumstances for 
these .negotiations. First, as discussed above, there was a .clear politi.cal commitment 
at the most senior level of all the Governments involved, in the form of specific 
instructions from both Ministers and Leaders. Since Ministers had also endorsed a 
set of 'principles and key elements' to be included in the Agreement, officials were 
able to get directly to work on the substance of the Agreement, without the need for 
lengthy negotiations on its scope> object or purpose. 
Second~ the countries invo~ved share common interests and already have close 
working relationships, particularly between their fisheries agencies whose officials 
meet frequently in a variety of fora. This -enabled meetings to be sdbeduled without 
too-much difficulty _(other than the usual Pacific fisheries dilemma. of fitting 
additional meetings into an already overcrowded calendar without keeping people 
away from home for too long). 
T~rd, specific _ fundi~~ was made available for the negotiations, through a 
commitment of $2.4 million. from the Australian Governm·. t t· d~ 1 and 
· . h·. A· . . . . . . en o eve op . implement t, e greement. This meant that meetings and wo ks.h ._ . . bl·e to 
-·d ·d . . . . . . . · · r · .·. ops were a 
be ~e~ , as an .. when necessary,. ~dmg was available to cover the travel costs. of 
participants from · all the countries involved and· t.he· Cha· . . . . ·d d ·th an 
. - . . . ' · · .1r was prov1 ·e wt · 
assistant to undertake inter-sess1onal work. This not onl ~ .... ·A • . • . . . e 
. . . · . . . . · - Y :u .l.4\fe 1t easier to secur 
the nece~sary input and ·expertise from, official& bu· t e , ed' 1 . · · d ... . . . . . . . . . . . · · · ' · nsur genera equity an 
125 Arti~le 13(5). 
126 Se~_: <http://~.O\dioaustralia.net.aulinte~ationallradi . . . . . . . . _ 
enhsts-drones-to-enforce-commercial-fishing-ba.n,I 115026~~~itam/pac1fic-beat/palau 
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transparency in the negotiations, since all FF A. members were able and encoura~ed 
to attend without needing to worry about costs~ It has also enabled the F~ A to hire 
an additional .Legal Adviser to assist FF A. members with the implementatloti of the 
Agreement at the domestic level. 
{b) The proce-ss: draft policy, drafting instructions, draft _text 
Against this backdrop, as directed by Ministers,. in A~~t 2010 the Parties to th.e 
Niue Treaty formed the Niue Treaty Drafting Group, led by an independent Chair, 
supported by a Chair's Assi&tant and the FFA Secretariat.127 In order to develop~ 
comprehensive and sensible Agreement within the two-year timeframe set by 
Ministers, which would cover all the issues required and operate effective.I~ in, a 
practical context, .the Drafting Group decided to draw o~ a practice fanuhar m 
domestic contexts - the developme1't of policy and drafting instructiof:lS. Over the 
course of four meetings, the Drafting Group developed a policy concept, turned that 
into a set of drafting instructions, and then asked the Chair to produce a draft text 
based on the drafting instructi0ns. 
Once the Chair'· produced a draft text~ the Drafting Group had a further four 
meetings to review and revise it, and, to develop the detail to be included in the 
Annexes (particularly the detail to be set out in the notifications in Annex C). To 
test the effectiveness and operation of the draft text, the FF A also convened a 
tabletop exercise, at which participants trialed the draft Agreement using a range of 
bilateral and multilateral practical scenarios. In addition, over the course of 
developmg the. Agreement; the Drafting Group sought mput from the FF A 
Monitoring, Control and Surveillance Working Group on practical and operational 
~ssues, to ensure that the policy elements wer-e appropriate and reflected relevant 
national and regional practice. 
This turned out .to be a· very efficient process and contributed greatly· to the 
successful conclusion of. the Agreement withirt the two-year timeframe. There are 
several reasons for this. · First,. it enabled officials ·with relevant policy and 
operat_ional expertise ·to · be involved, which ens~red that the Agreement was 
underpinned and infottned by practicaf objectives and d.esigned .to meet operational 
requirements. Second, . it alleviated the problem of attachment to particular words 
and phta~es,. w~h . c.an· impede both good policy and good drafting_,· and hold up 
progress. Third, it enabled the Agreement to· be. developed, in a holistic fashion and 
·reduced the opportunity for adverse unintended consequences to arise when varlous 
p~rts of ~e t~xt ~ete ·amendtd ·as ,?rafti~g~ progressed. Finally, and importantly, it 
enab~ed tlle praft1ng Gro-~p to cons1~er how every aspect of the text would work in 
pra~·tic~, which means that not only ts the Agr~ement thoroughly thought through at 
a ~ract~cal level, but, that a good _ de.a~ of th.e work and thinking that will be required 
to unplement the Agreement domestically has already been done by officials. 
. . . . . 
127 See ~inal Act _ o_f the Parties to the Niue -Tteaty on .Coo erati-0n · _ · , Survetllan~e and La_~ Enf~rcement in the ~outh Pacific Region ~n the ad lil f Fisb~~es 
A.gree1;11ent 0~ ~tren¢ientng brtptementat1on of the Niue Treaty oJi Co op ton~ - _e 
· Fl'sh~es Surv~an<;e and-.Law_ Enforcement i1l the Sfuith Pacific . op~tion m . 
the e1ghfb meeting of the .Part1es ~o . the Niue T{eaty Ho -. -- -sRf gi.on, adopted at 
November 2012 [8}: ~http:/twww.ffa~int/niue_treary>. ' . ma~a, o omon Islands, 2 
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Clearly, the process that was used to develop this Agrcctnont wiH not b. 
appropriate for the negotia~on of all international agr,eements. f lowcver, there arc : 
number of elements that might usefully be drawn on in other contexts; in particuJar 
the ideas of developing the policy before drafting the law, ensuring the opportunity 
for meaningful review and input from policy experts, and the potential to test-run 
the practical operation of draft provisions before they are Set in Stone, lf WC arc (6 
ensure that international law is an effective vehicle for achieving practicaJ 
outcomes, such a collaborative, cross-Oisciplinary approach wiU surely aid our 
endeavours. 
VI. Conclusion 
At its eighth and final meeting in Honiara, Solotnon Islands, on 26 Octo'bor 2012t 
the Drafting Group approved the final version of the draft text, and reported on the 
outcomes of its work to the Meeting of the Parties to the Niue Treaty on 
2 November 2012, at which the Agreement was unanimously adopted and opened 
for signature. 128 Palau became the first country to sign the Agreement on 9 
November 2012.129 Since then, a further seven countries have signed the 
Agreement (the Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Papua 
New Guinea, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, Samoa and Tuvalu), 130 and a 
number of other countries have advised that they are undertaking the domestic 
processes necessary to do so. It is to be hoped that the four ratifications required for 
entry into force will follow rapidly thereafter. However, 1ike its predecessor (the 
Niue Treaty}, the ultimate success or failure of this Agreement will depend on the 
extent to which it is actually used. What, then, is the actual prognosis for this '21 It 
century' treaty? Will it prove to be an effective vehicle for active cooperation in the 
fight against IUU fishing, languish in the statute books as a 'good idea', or gather 
dust with the Depositary as 'just another fisheries treaty'? 
This Agree.ment contains all the tools that its Parties need to cooperate 
effectively in fisheries enforcement, at all stages of the process ... from intelligence 
sharing to on-water enforcement, in-port inspections, and follow-up investigations. 
It p(ovides a comprehensive framework for easy cooperation, by building a flexible 
'opt-in' approach into a self-contained and prescriptive system in which 
information is readily accessible and Parties can agree to conduct cooperative 
activities simply by filling out the required information in the relevant notifications. 
And since a good deal of the work that will be needed to give effect to. th~ 
Agree~ent domestically has already been thought through as part of the 'pobcy 
process that was undertaken prior to drafting the text, cooperation should not be 
held up by lengthy implementation processes. Accordingly,. the Agreem~nt should 
be ready to use as soon as the fourth instrument of ratification is received. 
However, .there are a few issues that will be fundamental to the Agreement's 
success. The first is the provision of adequate support to develop and maintain the 
128 Ibid at {15] and [16]. , . . . . 
1 
mPd 129 FFA Press Release, Palau signs NJue Treaty Subsidiary Agreement , 9 No\fe 
2012: <http://www.ffa.int/node/691>. 
130 As at 13 September 2013. 
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information management systems necessary for the effective operation of the 
Agreement, and to ensure that the information and fisheries data and intelligence 
submitted by the Parties is stored securely and made available subject to the 
relevant security standards and data sharing protocol. This will be vital to secure 
and maintain the confidence of all Parties in the systems, processes and operation 
of the Agreement. Second, the Parties may need legal and operational support to 
assist with submission of the initial information and authority required for the Niue 
Treaty Information System, and to put in place mechanisms for the provision of 
fisheries data and intelligence. Finally, ongoing political commitment from 
Leaders, Ministers and senior officials will be required, to put words into action 
and help support the active cooperation envisaged in the Agreement, until such 
cooperation becomes the norm and we really do have 'strength through 
cooperation'. 
